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From September 2014–April 2015, six persons who had occupational exposures to Zaire ebolavirus in 
West Africa received investigational agents rVSV-ZEBOV or TKM-100802 for post-exposure 
prophylaxis and were monitored in the U.S. All patients experienced self-limited symptoms after PEP; 







Post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) after Ebola virus (EBOV) exposure can prevent infection or progression 
to severe Ebola virus disease (EVD) when administered promptly in non-human primates [1, 2]. Whether 
PEP prevents EVD after EBOV exposure in humans is unknown. Effective PEP is desirable to reduce 
progression to EVD after EBOV exposures, especially among healthcare personnel (HCP), who have a 
higher EVD incidence than non-HCP [3].  
 A few individuals were evacuated from West Africa to the U.S. after potential EBOV exposures 
and received PEP through FDA-approved emergency Investigation New Drug applications (eIND). 
Investigational PEP strategies include a recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus vaccine that expresses a 
Zaire ebolavirus surface glycoprotein (rVSV-ZEBOV), a small interfering RNA known as TKM-100802, 
favipiravir (RNA polymerase inhibitor), and ZMapp (monoclonal antibody cocktail against EBOV 
glycoprotein).  
Limited human data exist about PEP use for potential EBOV exposures and symptoms 
experienced after PEP administration. Previous reports described rVSV-ZEBOV administration to two 
physicians and a laboratory worker with percutaneous EBOV exposures [4-6]. One report of HCP 
medically evacuated to the U.K. after potential EBOV exposure described four individuals given PEP 
including favipiravir and monoclonal antibody cocktails ZMab, and MIL77 [7]. Of the seven patients 
described in these case reports who received investigational PEP, none developed EVD. We describe PEP 
use among six persons monitored in the U.S who experienced potential EBOV exposures during 2014–
2015.   
Methods 
This retrospective case series includes all persons who received PEP after a potential EBOV exposure in 
West Africa. Exposures included suspected percutaneous exposure to blood or body fluids of an EVD 
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patient, direct contact with an EVD patient while wearing inappropriate or compromised PPE, or other 
exposure thought to be of sufficient risk to warrant medical evacuation and consideration of PEP from 
September 2014–April 2015. Decisions about medical evacuation, whether to initiate PEP, which 
investigational agent would be used for PEP, the duration of hospital monitoring, and clinical and 
laboratory monitoring of PEP recipients, were made by clinicians at the treating facilities with input from 
public health authorities. The rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine was made available under an eIND application to 
the Food and Drug Administration; the protocol specified a dose of 108 pfu. TKM-100802 was also made 
available under an eIND application. All patients were monitored initially in U.S. healthcare facilities. 
EBOV nucleic acid testing of blood specimens was performed at USAMRIID using the EZ1 Real-time 
RT-PCR Assay or at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) using the CDC Ebola Virus 
NP and VP40 Real-time RT-PCR Assays. Clinicians who cared for PEP recipients were contacted to 
perform chart review using a standardized form to abstract patient characteristics, EBOV exposures, signs 
and symptoms after PEP administration, and laboratory results. Data were aggregated and summary 
results are presented. Data for one case were published previously [4]. This activity was determined to be 
non-research not requiring an Institutional Review Board determination at CDC.   
Results 
Six persons received PEP for a potential EBOV exposure assessed to be of sufficiently high risk from 
September 2014–April 2015. These included three nurses and two physicians who were working in Ebola 
treatment units (ETUs) when the exposures occurred, and one non-clinician worker (Table 1). All 
potential EBOV exposures were confirmed or suspected percutaneous exposures that occurred in Sierra 
Leone; five occurred in ETU patient care areas, and one occurred outside of a nearby ETU (Table 1). Half 
(3) of injuries involved hollow-bore needles, and two involved broken medication ampules; one injury 
occurred with an unknown sharp object. One person noticed the injury upon doffing personal protective 
equipment (PPE); the others recognized the injury immediately. No sharps were known to be 
contaminated with EBOV; however, the sharp penetrated potentially contaminated PPE in four PEP 
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recipients. One PEP recipient was not wearing any PPE at the time of injury. Percutaneous injuries 
occurred while administering medication (3), disposing of sharps (2), and turning a patient with EVD in 
bed (1). Upon recognizing the injury, all PEP recipients decontaminated the wound site within 15 minutes 
with a chlorine solution. All were medically evacuated to the U.S. within 2–3 days of injury.  
 Five patients received rVSV-ZEBOV at a dose of 108 pfu in a 1 mL solution; one received 
multiple TKM-100802 doses at 0.3–0.5 mg/kg daily. Time from EBOV exposure to PEP initiation was 1–
3 days. Two began PEP while in West Africa; four began PEP on the medical evacuation flight. HIV 
post-exposure prophylaxis was given to four individuals; the remaining two declined this intervention.  
All PEP recipients were isolated in U.S. healthcare facilities with at least standard, contact and 
droplet precautions initially; length of stay ranged from 3–19 days. All reported symptoms that began ≤1 
day after PEP initiation (Table 2). Of five who received rVSV-ZEBOV, the most commonly reported side 
effects were fever (4), headache (4), and nausea (4). Fever among rVSV-ZEBOV recipients began 12–24 
hours after rVSV-ZEBOV administration. Diarrhea was reported among two rVSV-ZEBOV recipients; 
diarrhea started 2 days after rVSV-ZEBOV administration for one, and the other had diarrhea that started 
one day prior to rVSV-ZEBOV administration. One rVSV-ZEBOV recipient vomited 4 days after PEP 
initiation. One rVSV-ZEBOV recipient developed a rash that appeared one day after PEP initiation and 
lasted for 18 days. Another rVSV-ZEBOV recipient reported joint pain starting on the day of PEP 
initiation and resolving by the next day. Three rVSV-ZEBOV recipients reported pain at the injection site. 
The TKM-100802 recipient developed a fever 48 hours after the first dose and developed redness, 
swelling, pain, and thrombophlebitis at multiple injection sites. All patients had resolved symptoms upon 
hospital discharge and were monitored through 21 days after their potential EBOV exposure. 
  No patients had laboratory evidence of EBOV infection. The EBOV glycoprotein, which is 
expressed by rVSV-ZEBOV, was detected in blood by RT-PCR in four of five rVSV-ZEBOV recipients. 
Three rVSV-ZEBOV recipient had detectable IgM and IgG antibodies to EBOV glycoprotein after 
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vaccination [4]. EBOV glycoprotein was not detected in blood by RT-PCR for the TKM-100802 
recipient. Among rVSV-ZEBOV recipients, EBOV nucleoprotein was not detected in blood collected ≥3 
days after exposure by RT-PCR. Three rVSV-ZEBOV recipients had RT-PCR for VSV nucleoprotein 
performed on blood; all had VSV detected.  
Discussion 
We describe six individuals who received PEP after potential EBOV exposures; none had RT-
PCR evidence of EBOV infection and none developed EVD. All patients reported symptoms after PEP 
administration which may have been attributable to PEP or to other factors, such as anxiety, stress, fatigue 
related to medical evacuation, or other medications including PEP for HIV.  
Safety studies of rVSV-ZEBOV among healthy volunteers have shown that rVSV-ZEBOV is 
generally well tolerated; early reactogenicity symptoms are common, and rare occurrences of arthritis and 
vesicular dermatitis have been reported [8-10]. While one of the five rVSV-ZEBOV recipients reported 
joint pain, none reported arthritis; one person reported a rash. All PEP recipients’ symptoms resolved by 
the time of hospital discharge. An ongoing ring vaccination trial, designed to examine use of rVSV-
ZEBOV at a lower dose of 2 x 107 pfu/mL for rapid pre-exposure prophylaxis rather than for PEP [11], 
may provide additional data on safety, efficacy in prevention of EVD, and duration of protection [12]. 
Additional vaccine trials that aim to immunize healthcare and other frontline workers prior to an EBOV 
exposure event are ongoing [13].   
Of the few reports of TKM-100802 for treatment of EVD, fever and rigors were described in one 
patient, the drug was discontinued in another patient due to multi-organ system failure, and a third patient 
experienced hypotension after the initial infusion [14, 15]. The patient who received TKM-100802 for 
EBOV PEP experienced fever and injection site reactions, and therapy was stopped after dose 5 of 7 due 
to these side effects.  
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 This report is subject to limitations. The small number of PEP recipients makes it difficult to 
generalize any of the clinical findings. PEP was uncontrolled; therefore, we cannot determine whether 
rVSV-ZEBOV or TKM-100802 were effective in preventing EVD. While the exposures described among 
PEP recipients were assumed to be high risk for the purpose of public health monitoring, it was not 
determined whether EBOV exposure actually occurred since no testing was performed on the sharps or 
PPE to document presence of EBOV.  
 None of the PEP recipients reported here or previously [4-6] developed evidence of EBOV 
infection, but it is unknown whether PEP prevented EVD. While the effectiveness of PEP remains unclear 
from this small case series, high-risk exposures are likely to occur in the future, and timely PEP 
availability and administration may help in reducing the risk of progression to EVD. Priorities for PEP 
research include using observational studies or clinical trials when feasible to determine the highest risk 
EBOV exposures, the optimal time and “window period” for PEP, the safety profile of candidate PEP 
therapies, and the most effective interventions to prevent EVD after high-risk EBOV exposures. 
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Table 1: Potential high-risk EBOV exposures experienced by U.S. PEP recipients 
Occupation Exposure PEP (time from EBOV 
exposure to initiation) 
Physician Physician manipulated an intravenous cannula on a viremic EVD 
patient; while wearing the same gloves, physician drew up medication 
from an ampule and accidentally stuck needle through both pairs of 
gloves.  
TKM-100802 (2 days) 
Nurse Nurse was providing patient care in an ETU, which included delivering 
medications and meals and cleaning up bloody emesis and broken glass 
medication ampules. The nurse did not recognize that an injury had 
occurred, but during doffing noted a tear in one glove and found a 
bleeding laceration.  
rVSV-ZEBOV (3 days) 
Other ETU 
worker 
Worker picked up with bare hands a cardboard box that contained 
sharps lying in the grass near an ETU that was being renovated. 
Hollow-bore needle pierced ungloved hand. Unknown whether needle 
could have been contaminated with EBOV; ETU had not had an EVD 
rVSV-ZEBOV (24 hours) 
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patient for about 2 weeks.  
Nurse Nurse broke a glass medication ampule while working in an ETU. The 
nurse continued to work for about 15 minutes before inspecting gloves; 
both layers of gloves had been penetrated and blood was noted at the 
point of penetration.  
rVSV-ZEBOV (27 hours) 
Physician A hollow-bore needle that was not contaminated with body fluids from 
an EVD patient pierced contaminated gloves while physician was 
disposing of needle in an overflowing sharps container.  
rVSV-ZEBOV (43 hours) 
Nurse Nurse felt sharp prick to finger while turning a severely ill EVD patient 
with an open draining wound; no needle/sharp found.  No skin puncture 
noted initially, but red pin-sized wound found on finger next day.  
rVSV-ZEBOV (3 days) 
Abbreviations: EBOV, Ebola virus. PEP, post-exposure prophylaxis. EVD, Ebola virus disease. TKM-100802. rVSV-ZEBOV. ETU, Ebola 




Table 2: Characteristics, signs, and symptoms of persons receiving post-exposure prophylaxis for 
potential high-risk EBOV exposures (N=6) 
Characteristic 
 Male, n (%) 4 (67) 
Age, median years (range) 39 (36–45) 
Occupational role at time of exposure, n (%) 
 Nurse 3 (50) 
Physician 2 (33) 
Non-healthcare worker 1 (17) 
Exposed by percutaneous injury, n (%) 6 (100) 
Type of sharp, n (%) 
 Hollow-bore needle 3 (50) 
Broken medication ampule 2 (33) 
Unknown 1 (17) 
Sharp and PPE (glove) EBOV contamination status, n (%) 
 Non-contaminated sharp through contaminated PPE 2 (33) 
Non-contaminated sharp through PPE recently cleaned with chlorine 
solution 1 (17) 
Unknown sharp through contaminated PPE 2 (33) 
Unknown sharp, no PPE 1 (17) 
Activity at time of sharps injury, n (%) 
 Medication administration 3 (50) 
Disposing of sharps 2 (33) 
Turning patient 1 (17) 
Time from exposure to initial decontamination, range 5-15 minutes 
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Type of PEP received, n (%) 
 rVSV-ZEBOV 5 (83) 
TKM-100802 1 (17) 
Time from exposure to PEP initiation, range 1–3 days 
Location of PEP initiation, n (%) 
 West Africa 2 (33) 
On medical evacuation flight 4 (67) 







Fever 4 Yes 
Highest fever, range °C 37.3–39.1 38.1 
Myalgias 3 Unknown 
Chills/rigors 3 No 
Diaphoresis 3 No 
Hypotension 1 Yes* 
Malaise 2 No 
Fatigue 3 Unknown 
Headache 4 Yes 
Dizziness 1 No 
Arthralgia 1 No 
Arthritis 0 No 
Rash 1 No 
Chest pain 1 No 
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Dyspnea 1 No 
Hypoxia 1 No 
Nausea 4 No 
Vomiting 1 No 
Diarrhea 2 No 
Local reactions  
  Redness 0 Yes 
Swelling 0 Yes 
Pain 3 Yes 
Thrombophlebitis 0 Yes 
* Lowest blood pressure was 90/56 while asleep; resolved without intervention.  
Abbreviations: EBOV, Ebola virus. PPE, personal protective equipment. PEP, post-exposure prophylaxis. 
rVSV-ZEBOV. TKM-100802.  
